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1. Introduction
The topic of shared administration, or composite procedures,
is one which has not only attracted considerable scholarly attention in the last
years1, but also come increasingly often to the attention of the Court of Justice.
While the existence of composite procedures (definable as decision-making
processes involving multiple jurisdictions participating at different moments
and with different intensities)2 is not a new phenomenon and has virtually ex-
isted since the beginning of the project of European integration, it is in the last
years that several interesting questions have been brought to the attention of
the Court of Justice, with the aim of clarifying, in particular, the judicial impli-
cations of this system of administrative governance.3 Indeed, whereas the system
of decision-making for the implementation of EU law is increasingly shared
and composite in nature, the system of judicial protection has remained in
principle anchored to a model based on domestic jurisdiction, whereby the
court competent to review a certain administrative act or action is the court
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*
M. Eliantonio, ‘Judicial review in an integrated administration: the case of “composite proce-
dures"' (2014) 7 REALaw 65; F. Brito Bastos, ‘The Borelli Doctrine Revisited: Three Issues of
1
Coherence in a Landmark Ruling for EU Administrative Justice’ (2015) 8 REALaw 269; F. Brito
Bastos, ‛Derivative Illegality in European Composite Administrative Procedures’ (2018) 55
CMLR 101; J. Fernández Gaztea, ‘A Jurisdiction of Jurisdictions’ (2019) 12 REALaw 1. With regard
to composite procedures involving agencies: M. Scholten and M. Luchtman (eds), Law Enforce-
ment by EU Authorities: Implications for Political and Judicial Accountability (Edward Elgar 2017).
With regard to composite procedure involving data sharing activities, see the special issue 20(1)
of European Public Law (2014). In relation to pharmaceuticals authorisations see S. Röttger-
Wirtz and M. Eliantonio, ‘From Integration to Exclusion: EU Composite Administration and
Gaps in Judicial Accountability in the Authorisation of Pharmaceuticals’ (2010) 10 EJRR 393.
See for this definition, M. Eliantonio (n1) 65.2
See for instance case C-562/12 Liivimaa Lihaveis MTÜ [2014] EU:C:2014:2229.3
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belonging to the legal system in which the act or action is imputable, regardless
of whether it is part of a larger multi-jurisdictional decision-making process.
In the Borelli case,4 the Court of Justice was faced with an important question
concerning the division of labour between itself and the national courts in a
composite procedure, a case which has remained unchanged and unchallenged
to date. Twenty-five years later, the Berlusconi case adds an important piece to
the puzzle of the mechanism establishing the division of labour in composite
procedures.5 However, it also leaves a number of questions still open. Crucially,
as the ruling consecrates a generous understanding of the Court’s jurisdiction
in composite procedures, it begs further questions and raises new issues.
This case note proceeds as follows: first, it presents the facts of the case;
secondly, it analyses the ruling of the Court and, where relevant, the opinion
of the Advocate General (AG); thirdly, it discusses a number of implications
arising from the ruling, and places it in the wider context of the Court’s case
law on the ECB and European multi-level administrative governance. In partic-
ular, this case note argues that, while unsurprising in the context of earlier case
law on composite procedures, the Berlusconi ruling contributes to clarifying the
conditions and modalities of the Court’s jurisdiction in composite procedures,
but still leaves a number of unanswered questions concerning the ‘reach’ of
judicial review when shared administration is at stake.
2. Facts of the case
This case arose in the context of the new Banking Union set
up following the Eurozone crisis.6 It concerns the former Italian Prime Minister
Silvio Berlusconi and his holding company Fininvest. In the 1990s, Fininvest
acquired around 30% of the shares of a mixed financial holding company,
named Mediolanum SpA, which included, among others, a bank, Banca Me-
diolanum. In 2013, following proceedings which went all the way up to the
Italian Corte di Cassazione, Silvio Berlusconi was found guilty of tax fraud and,
as a result, was disqualified from public office and managing corporations for
a period of two years. Under European law, holders of qualifying holdings in
credit institutions must fulfill a certain number of criteria. Among others, Article
23 of the ‘Capital Requirements Directive’ (also known as ‘CRD IV’)7 establishes
Case C-97/91 Oleificio Borelli v Commission [1992] EU:C:1992:491.4
For another analysis of the case, see F. Brito Bastos, ‘Judicial review of composite administrative
procedures in the Single Supervisory Mechanism: Berlusconi’ (2019) 56 CMLR 1355.
5
In general, see D. Busch and G. Ferrarini, European Banking Union (OUP 2015); G Lo Schiavo
(ed), The European Banking Union and the Role of Law (Edward Elgar 2019); F. Martucci, L’union
bancaire (Bruylant 2016).
6
Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access
to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and
7
investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and
2006/49/EC [2013] OJ L176/338. The Directive forms part of the so-called ‘Single Rulebook’,
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that such holders must be deemed ‘suitable’, in light of their reputation,
knowledge, skills and experience. The relevant provision (Article 25) of the
Italian ‘Consolidated Law on Banking’ transposing the CRD IV similarly requires
these holders to be of ‘good reputation’ and to satisfy criteria of ‘competence
and integrity’, in order to ensure the sound and prudent management of banks.
Upon his conviction, the Italian financial supervisory authorities, the Banca
d’Italia, and the Istituto per la vigilanza sulle assicurazioni (IVASS) initiated a
procedure which, in 2014, resulted in a decision finding that Silvio Berlusconi
no longer fulfilled the reputation requirement, and therefore imposing that
Fininvest’s holdings in Mediolanum be limited to under 10%. Berlusconi and
Fininvest challenged that decision before the Italian courts, and ultimately were
successful before the Consiglio di Stato, which annulled the decision of Banca
d’Italia, for reasons pertaining to the temporal applicability and the retroactive
application of the relevant Italian legislation.
In the meantime, via a merger by ‘reverse integration’, Mediolanum was
acquired by, and incorporated into, its subsidiary Banca Mediolanum. The
merger was approved by Banca d’Italia, however considering later that, as a
result of the operation, Fininvest had acquired a qualifying holding directly in
a financial institution. In line with guidance provided by the European Central
Bank (ECB), Banca d’Italia considered that a fresh authorization related to the
acquisition of this new holding was required, and urged Fininvest to submit
an application in that regard. That request was not acted upon and Banca d’Italia
commenced an administrative procedure on its own initiative. The procedure
culminated in the ECB, which had become competent on the matter under the
newly established Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The ECB thus adopted
a decision on 25 October 2016 finding that the indirect acquirer of the qualified
holding in Banca Mediolanum, namely Silvio Berlusconi, did not meet the
reputation requirement, and was doubtful as to his ‘ability to ensure that Banca
Mediolanum would be managed soundly and prudently in the future’.8 As a
consequence, the acquisition of the qualifying holding in Banca Mediolanum
by Silvio Berlusconi and Fininvest was opposed by the ECB.
Under the newly established SSM framework, the granting of authorizations
for acquisitions of qualifying holdings in credit institutions is subject to a
complex administrative procedure, organized by Articles 4(1)(c), 6(4) and 15 of
which incorporates into EU law the ‘Basel III agreements’, i.e. a harmonized set of prudential
measures developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in response to the financial
crisis.
ECB Decision of 25 October 2016, ECB/SSM/20016-7LVZJ6XRIE7VNZ4UBX81/4, not made
public.
8
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the SSM Regulation,9 and Articles 85 to 87 of SSM Framework Regulation.10
It culminates with a final decision by the ECB, which therefore enjoys an exclus-
ive decision-making power.11 However, following a multi-level pattern, it closely
involves national authorities in charge of financial supervision (known as ‘na-
tional competent authorities’ or NCAs) which intervene at all stages of the
procedure, and issue different acts, of a preparatory nature, in that context.12
NCAs collect notifications of acquisitions, and forward them to the ECB. They
conduct a first assessment of the proposed acquisitions that are notified to
them, in light of the relevant legislative requirements. On that basis, they prepare
draft decisions (to oppose or not to oppose the acquisition) that they pass on to
the ECB, which shall then conduct its own assessment and take the final de-
cision. This is the reason why Banca d’Italia, and to a lesser extent IVASS, were
closely associated in the procedure at stake, most notably by collecting the
necessary information, and by proposing, in a draft decision submitted on 23
September 2016, that the acquisition ought to be opposed, for the main reason
that its acquirers did not meet the reputation requirement.
That ECB decision is currently subject to an action for annulment before
the General Court of the European Union, jointly launched by Silvio Berlusconi
and Fininvest.13 An azione di ottemperanza (i.e. an action to seek compliance
Council Regulation 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European
Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions
[2013] OJ L287/63.
9
Regulation 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework
for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank
and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities [2014] OJ L141/1.
10
It is important to emphasize that the ECB exercises this authorization competence with regard
to all banks, whatever their size or importance. These types of procedures, often referred to as
11
common procedures, are fully centralized, and therefore derogate from the general division
of labour under the SSM, according to which the ECB only directly supervises significant finan-
cial institutions, while banks deemed less significant remain in principle under the surveillance
of NCAs. In that regard, see Article 6(4)(5) of the SSM Regulation. On this division of tasks,
see Case T-122/15 Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg - Förderbank v European Central
Bank [2017] EU:T:2017:337, paras 20-29. See also C. Brescia Mora, ‘The Interplay between the
ECB and NCA’s in the “Common Procedures” under the SSM Regulation’ (2018) 84 Banca
d’Italia – Quaderni di Ricerca Giuridica della Consulenza Legale, 84-86.
The close cooperation between the ECB and NCAs is one of the defining features of the SSM.
The reasons are of course manifold, but such strong involvement of national supervisors can
12
be best explained by the youth of the ECB as a prudential authority, and the benefits it may
gain from the expertise, experience, resources, and insider knowledge of NCAs. In that regard,
see G. Lo Schiavo, ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism – Building a New Top-down Cooperative
Supervisory Governance in Europe’ in F. Fabbrini et al (eds), What Form of Government for the
European Union and the Eurozone? (Hart 2015) 111-130. States participating in the SSM freely
designate the national organ which is to act as NCA under the SSM framework (Article 2(2)
of the SSM Regulation). Depending on the model they favor (integration or separation), the
NCA will either be the national central bank, or a separate authority. In that regard, see
M. Goldmann, ‘United in Diversity? The Relationship between Monetary Policy and Prudential
Supervision in the Banking Union’ (2018) 14 EuConst 283, 283-310.
See Case T-913/16 Fininvest and Berlusconi v ECB, currently pending.13
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with a court’s ruling which has acquired the force of res judicata) was also
brought before the Consiglio di Stato, in which the applicants requested the an-
nulment of several preparatory acts adopted by Banca d’Italia in the framework
of this procedure (most notably the draft decision of 23 September 2016) for
disregarding the res judicata of the Consiglio di Stato’s previous ruling.
It is in the framework of these national proceedings that the reference to
the Court of Justice was made. The Consiglio di Stato sought clarification as to
the nature of the authorization procedure set up by the SSM Regulation, the
exact division of tasks between the ECB and the NCAs in that context, and its
implications in terms of judicial review. It raised two questions. The first related
to the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction in the complex administrative procedure
of authorization set up under the SSM: is it exclusive and total, encompassing
the preparatory acts adopted at the national level, or split between the Court
and national judiciaries, depending on the author of the act at stake? The second
question related to a specific circumstance of the case, i.e. the existence of a
previous ruling of the Consiglio di Stato which acquired the force of res judicata
and the nature of the proceedings in the framework of which the reference was
made (the azione di ottemperanza), and its influence on the Court’s assessment.
In view of its significance and landmark status, this case note primarily focuses
on the first question only.
3. Judgment of the Court
In its ruling, the Court starts by explaining the different effects
that the involvement of national authorities in the course of an administrative
procedure, leading up to the adoption of an EU act (a composite administrative
procedure),14 entails for ‘the division of jurisdiction between EU courts and
courts of the Member States’.15 In direct line with what had been suggested by
AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona,16 the Court draws a clear distinction between
two scenarios.
Under the first one, firstly identified in the Sweden v Commission ruling,17
the involvement of national authorities in the complex administrative procedure
only constitutes a stage of such procedure, and does not affect the exclusive and
Brito Bastos rightly points out that the concept is for the time ever used by the Court of Justice,
in para. 38 of the Berlusconi ruling: F. Brito Bastos (n5) 1367.
14
Case C-219/17 Silvio Berlusconi and Fininvest v Banca d’Italia and IVASS [2018] EU:C:2018:1023
(Berlusconi), para. 40.
15
Case C-219/17 Silvio Berlusconi and Fininvest v Banca d’Italia and IVASS [2018] EU:C:2018:502,
Opinion of AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona, paras 40, 57-79.
16
Case C-64/05 P Sweden v Commission [2007] EU:C:2007:802, paras 93-94. According to Brito
Bastos, the choice of this case as reference point is rather surprising, as there would have been,
in his Opinion, more relevant precedents. F. Brito Bastos (n5) 1369-1370.
17
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final decision-making power of the competent EU institution – for example by
binding it through preparatory acts or proposals adopted by national authorities.
In these cases, jurisdiction over the whole procedure belongs exclusively to EU
courts, which are to rule not only on the legality of the final decision adopted
by the EU institution, but also on ‘any defects vitiating the preparatory acts or
the proposals of the national authorities that would be such as to affect the
validity of that final decision’.18 For the Court, such a single judicial review is
warranted by Article 263 TFEU, read in light of the principle of sincere cooper-
ation (Article 4(3) TEU).19 More specifically, the Court notes that, should national
remedies against preparatory acts or proposals be tolerated, the risk of divergent
assessments could not be ruled out and the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction would
be compromised.20 Such remedies are thus to be excluded, whatever their type,
as well as the nature of the heads of claim or pleas put forward in their frame-
work.21
Under the second scenario (the Borelli scenario),22 the national authorities’
involvement in the procedure is much more decisive, and constitutes ‘a neces-
sary stage of a procedure for adopting an EU act in which the EU institutions
have only a limited or no discretion, so that the national act is binding on the
EU institution’.23 National acts adopted in the framework of such procedures
remain for the national courts to examine, while the European courts retain
jurisdiction over the final EU measure.
In light of this distinction, the Court then moves to assess the complex ad-
ministrative procedure at stake: the prior authorization of any acquisition of,
or increase in, a qualifying holding in a credit institution, as primarily regulated
by Article 4(1)(c) and 15 of the SSM Regulation and Articles 85 and 86 of the
SSM Framework Regulation. More specifically, the Court’s efforts focus on
spelling out the specific division of tasks between the ECB and NCAs in that
specific context. Its assessment, perfectly in line with that of AG Campos
Sánchez-Bordona,24 is unequivocal: the authorization procedure belongs to the
first scenario.25 Following Article 4(1)(c) of the SSM Regulation, the ECB is ex-





Case C-97/91 Oleificio Borelli v Commission [1992] EU:C:1992:491, paras 9-10.22
Berlusconi, para. 45.23
The analysis carried out is however much more exhaustive. See Berlusconi, Opinion of AG
Campos Sánchez-Bordona, paras 92-115.
24
Berlusconi, paras 53-56. In that regard, Brito Bastos uses the term of ‘reverse Borelli’ to describe
the Berlusconi scenario. See F. Brito Bastos (n5) 1370-1375.
25
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tions.26 Moreover, if NCAs are to play a role in the procedure, that role is only
supplementary, and not such as to challenge the exclusive decision-making
power of the ECB. For example, the Court points out that NCAs are tasked with
registering the applications for authorization, and with assisting the ECB
throughout the procedure. It is in that context that they provide the ECB with
the necessary information to conduct its assessments and, crucially, submit
draft decisions, which do not however bind the ECB and are not notified to the
applicant.27
On that basis, the Court ruled that its exclusive jurisdiction does not only
cover the final EU act at stake (i.e. the ECB decision of 25 October 2016 opposing
the acquisition), but also ‘as an incidental matter’28 the national preparatory
acts adopted by Banca d’Italia, the defects and eventual unlawfulness of which
may affect the legality of the final EU act. As a consequence, any jurisdiction
of national courts in respect of those acts must be excluded, whatever the type
of action launched before them. The specific fact that the action launched before
the Consiglio di Stato was an azione in ottemperanza was therefore deemed irrel-
evant.29
4. The implications of the ruling: the division of labour
between courts in the context of composite
procedures
4.1. The Berlusconi ruling in the context of the case law of
financial supervision and of composite procedures:
a new – but predictable – step?
The Berlusconi ruling forms part of a growing body of case law
devoted to financial supervision in the European Union.30 The emergence of
the SSM as a new vehicle for integration, endowed with novel and unprecedented
features,31 has brought about new legal questions (for example, as to the nature
Berlusconi, para. 54. Such qualification of the ECB’s competence as exclusive builds upon the
Court’s earlier findings in the Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg ruling (para. 54). Brito
26
Bastos deems this terminological choice unfortunate, considering the fact that, in ‘common





For a general overview, see M. Prek and S. Lefèvre, ‘Le contentieux de la surveillance pruden-
tielle des établissements de crédit devant le tribunal de l’Union européenne’ (2019) 250 Journal
de droit européen 99.
30
Boucon and Jaros have powerfully argued that ‘the SSM breaks with traditional modes of
European integration, and constitutes a hybrid mode of execution of EU law in the sense that:
31
(i) it furthers European integration to the extent that supervision per se had been centralized
in the hands of the ECB, but (ii) it limits European integration to the extent that it still leaves
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of this new legal construct, the division of tasks between the constitutive units
of this novel administrative system, and the structure of judicial review) and
prompted the Court of Justice to intervene in order to clarify certain aspects of
the institutional architecture of the SSM. Berlusconi constitutes a milestone, as
it contributed to disentangling the complex interplay between the ECB and
national supervisors under the SSM framework. It makes sense of its repercus-
sions on the structure of judicial review and the respective jurisdiction of na-
tional and EU courts, and sets a clear path for the judicial protection of those
affected by the decisions taken under the SSM framework.32
The Berlusconi ruling did certainly not come as a surprise. In view of the
architecture of the SSM, its highly centralized nature, and more generally, the
founding rationale of the Banking Union,33 it is only logical that the Court de-
cided that its jurisdiction was also to encompass the preparatory acts adopted
by national supervisory authorities. The ruling did however further assert and
consolidate the position of the Court under this construct, and thereby contrib-
utes to exacerbate the supranational dynamics, and hierarchical nature, of the
SSM. It is probably for this reason that the Court did not exclusively base its
findings on its case law on composite administrative procedures and on the
Sweden v Commission precedent, but also conveyed, in a somewhat convoluted
manner: the effectiveness of decision-making under the SSM,34 the principle
of effective judicial protection,35 and the duty of sincere cooperation.36 This
trend had already been set in motion in the Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg
- Förderbank ruling, where the Court established that the ECB had been trans-
ferred an exclusive competence regarding prudential supervision in the Euro-
zone, and that when intervening under the SSM framework, NCAs were not
exercising a competence of their own, but were acting within the scope of de-
centralized implementation of an exclusive EU competence.37 Clearly, Berlusconi
it up to the Member States to decide how to supervise credit institutions covered by the SSM’.
See L. Boucon and D. Jaros, ‘The Application of National Law by the European Central Bank
within the EU Banking Union’s Single Supervisory Mechanism – A New Mode of European
Integration?’ (2018) 10 EJLS 182.
For early assessments on these issues, see L. Wissink, T. Duijkersloot and R. Widdershoven,
‘Shifts in Competences between Member States and the EU in the New Supervisory System
32
for Credit Institutions and their Consequences for Judicial Protection’ (2014) 10 Utrecht L Rev
92; G. ter Kuile, L. Wissink and W. Bovenschen, ‘Tailor-Made Accountability within the Single
Supervisory Mechanism’ (2015) 52 CMLR 180.
The Banking Union, as a political project, was primarily meant to end the fragmentation of





Case T-125/15 Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg - Förderbankv European Central Bank [2017]
EU:T:2017:337, paras 50-64. This General Court ruling was confirmed on appeal by the Court
37
of Justice. See Case C-450/17 P Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg - Förderbankv European
Central Bank [2019] EU:C:2019:372.
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exacerbates the trend towards centralization and supranationalism, at the ex-
pense of transnationalism.38
From a more general perspective, Berlusconi also constitutes a welcome –
yet unsurprising – addition to the Court’s case law on the structure of judicial
review under complex administrative procedures. It makes clear that, in the
system of composite procedures, the respective jurisdiction of national courts
and the ECJ depends on the legal effects attached to national preparatory acts
(binding or non-binding), and on the level of discretion retained by the final
EU decision-maker. From this perspective, it fully confirms the earlier argu-
ments advanced in doctrine with respect to the Court’s position in relation to
the so-called “derivative illegality” of EU measures based on unlawful national
preparatory measures.39
In particular, in the Borelli situations, a number of EU constitutional argu-
ments, namely the limits of the ECJ jurisdiction to review EU law measures
and the autonomy of EU law as a legal order vis-à-vis that of the Member States
seem to sustain the impossibility of “derivative illegality”: if national preparatory
measures were able to contaminate final EU measures, the autonomy of EU
law would be threatened, and if the ECJ were able to review these measures,
the prohibition for the EU courts to adjudicate on national measures would be
by-passed.40 These arguments, however, do not function as a hurdle to the ju-
risdiction of the ECJ to review national preparatory measures in Berlusconi
situations. This is because of at least one discernible difference between the
two scenarios. In the Berlusconi scenario, the national error is implicitly
ascribable to the EU level, because of the discretion enjoyed by the EU authorities
to diverge from the national preparatory measure. The jurisdiction of the Court
of Justice over national preparatory measures seems therefore much more
justifiable than in Borelli situations where EU authorities bear no responsibility
neither for making the error (made at the national level) eventually contamin-
ating the EU measure, nor for endorsing it (given the lack of discretion available
to the EU authority under such decision-making processes). Whenever the EU
authorities fully endorse an invalid national preparatory measure (even though
they had the power, and possibly the duty, to control its lawfulness), such as in
Sweden v Commission,41 or where they fail to correct procedural errors which
occurred at national level but could have been rectified at the EU level, such as
in France Aviation,42 the responsibility for the entirety of the composite decision-
E. Chiti and F. Recine, ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism in Action – Institutional Adjustment
and the Reinforcement of the ECB Position’ (2018) 24 EPL 101.
38
F. Brito Bastos (n1).39
These arguments are further aptly discussed in F. Brito Bastos (n1) 110-113.40
Case C-64/05 P Sweden v Commission [2007] EU:C:2007:802.41
Case T-346/94 France-aviation v Commission [1995] EU:T:1995:187.42
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making process rests at the EU level, and, as a consequence, the jurisdiction for
the entirety of the composite decision-making process belongs to the ECJ.43
The imputability of the entire decision-making process to the EU level,
arising as a consequence of the non-binding nature of the national preparatory
measure and the margin of discretion afforded to the EU authorities with respect
to the national measure therefore, in the Court’s view, justifies a solution not
merely different, but one opposite44 to the strict denial of “derivative illegality”
advanced in Borelli. Hence, a solution on the basis of which national courts are
forbidden from adjudicating on the national measures which are part of a
composite procedure culminating at EU level, with the sole jurisdiction for
these measures belonging to the European courts.
4.2. Berlusconi and Rimšēvičs: expansive move on the part of
the CJEU?
As a ruling which contributes to expanding the potential or
actual reach of the Court’s jurisdiction, the Berlusconi ruling ought to be read
in parallel with another decision rendered two months later, in a distinct but
related context: the Rimšēvičs judgment.45Rimšēvičs was decided in the context
of the operations of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), and con-
cerned the validity of a decision by the Latvian anti-corruption office to tempor-
arily suspend from office the governor of the Central Bank of Latvia, Mr
Rimšēvičs, in view of ongoing criminal prosecutions and the various charges
pending against him. That decision was challenged by both Mr Rimšēvičs and
the ECB itself, which argued that there were no indications of a serious miscon-
duct, and that the removal thereby undermined the principle of central bank
independence enshrined in Articles 130 and 131 TFEU. Applicants based their
Along the same lines see F. Brito Bastos (n1).43
The idea of Berlusconi opting for an ‘opposite’ solution than the one proposed in Borelli is ad-
vanced by F. Brito Bastos (n5) 1370-1375.
44
Cases C-202/18 and C-232/18 Ilmārs Rimšēvičs and European Central Bank v Republic of
Latvia [2019] EU:C:2019:139 (Rimšēvičs). On this decision, see D. Sarmiento, ‘Crossing the
45
Baltic Rubicon’ (Verfassungsblog, 4 March 2019) verfassungsblog.de/crossing-the-baltic-rubicon/
accessed 11 October 2019; J. Bast, ‘Autonomy in Decline? A Comment on Rimsevics and ECB
v Latvia’ (Verfassungsblog, 13 May 2019) verfassungsblog.de/autonomy-in-decline-a-comment-
ary-on-rimsevics-and-ecb-v-latvia/ accessed 11 October 2019; M. Costa, ‘Accountability and In-
dependence of the Governors of National Banks – Any Role for the CJEU?’ (EULawAnalysis,
25 March 2019) eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2019/03/accountability-and-independence-of.html
accessed 11 October 2019; R. Smits, ‘ECJ annuls a national measure against an independent
central banker’ (European Law Blog, 5 March 2019) europeanlawblog.eu/2019/03/05/ecj-annuls-
a-national-measure-against-an-independent-central-banker/ accessed 11 October 2019; P-E.
Pignarre, ‘Anatomie d’une première: Le contrôle de légalité d’une mesure nationale par la
CJUE’ (Blog de Droit Européen, 9 May 2019) blogdroiteuropeen.com/2019/05/09/anatomie-
dune-premiere-le-controle-de-legalite-dune-mesure-nationale-par-la-cjue-par-pierre-emmanuel-
pignarre/ accessed 11 October 2019.
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action on Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, a remedy which had never
been activated before. According to that provision, decisions relieving governors
of national central banks from office may be referred to the Court of Justice by
the relieved governor or by the ECB Governing Council ‘on grounds of infringe-
ment of the EU Treaties or of any rule of law relating to its application’. Central
and ground-breaking in Rimšēvičs was the Court’s assessment of the nature of
that atypical remedy, and the effects born by the Court orders issued in that
context. In a nutshell, the Court was asked to choose between two possible op-
tions: did that remedy constitute an infringement procedure of some sort,
leading to a merely declaratory judgment, to be followed upon by national au-
thorities (along the lines of Articles 258 to 260 TFEU)? Or did it amount to a
specific type of annulment action, which could produce cassatory effects (fol-
lowing the logic of Article 263 TFEU)? Despite the fact that both applicants (Mr
Rimšēvičs and the ECB) and AG Kokott46 had argued along the lines of the
first view, the Court unexpectedly favored the second. Having found that Latvia
had failed to establish that the decision to relieve Mr Rimšēvičs from office was
based on sufficient indications he had engaged in serious misconduct,47 the
Court directly annulled the contested decision by the Latvian anti-corruption
office.48 The decision of the Court to classify the remedy provided for by Article
14.2 as an action for annulment relied on both a literal and a teleological reading
of that provision. The Court indeed found objective similarities with Article
263 TFEU (length of the appeal period, nature of the pleas, identity of potential
applicants). More fundamentally, the Court deemed this derogation from the
general distribution of powers between national courts and EU courts justified
in view of the ‘particular institutional context in which the ESCB operates’.49
The Court indeed considered that ‘the ESCB represents a novel legal construct
in EU law which brings together national institutions, namely the national
central banks, and an EU institution, namely the ECB, and causes them to co-
operate closely with each other, and within which a different structure and a
less marked distinction between the EU legal order and national legal orders
prevails’.50 Further building upon the hybrid status of the governors of national
central banks under the ESCB51 and the centrality of the principle of independ-
ence in the ESCB’s operations52, the Court thus found that only a proper action
for annulment ‘is capable of addressing the concerns which led to the creation
Case C-202/18 Ilmārs Rimšēvičs and European Central Bank v Republic of Latvia [2018]
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of that legal remedy [Article 14.2 of the ESCB Statute]’.53Rimšēvičs does constitute
the first instance of an EU Court directly annulling an act of national law and
extracting it from its domestic legal order. In that it goes beyond the principled
separation of legal orders which thus far had governed the EU legal space, and
beyond the general distribution of powers between EU and national courts
flowing from it, it has been described as ‘a revolution with the potential of
changing EU law forever’.54 According to Bast, Rimšēvičs pushes the EU ‘one
step further along the federal path to fusing EU law and Member States law
into one single legal order’, as it highlights ‘the common foundations and co-
operative elements of the European constitutional order’.55
Of course, one should be careful not to read too much into Rimšēvičs. As
the Court itself puts it,56 the remedy at stake is very specific, and the issue it is
designed to address (threats to the constitutional principle of central bank inde-
pendence) is a very particular and grave one. More generally, the institutional
framework it is part of, i.e. that of the ESCB, is characterized by the highest
level of integration and centralization. It indeed relates to a policy field, monetary
policy, which belongs fully and exclusively to the EU. If the ESCB is a multi-
level administrative system, decision-making is as a matter of principle concen-
trated at the supranational level, the state level being solely relied upon for im-
plementation purposes. Hazardous analogies derived from Rimšēvičs ought
thus to be avoided. One can however not help drawing a parallel between the
institutional context in which Rimšēvičs was decided and that of the SSM, on
which this note focuses.57 It is our view that the SSM, just like the ESCB, can
be characterized, to paraphrase the ECJ, as a ‘novel legal construct’ bringing
together national institutions (the 19 internal supervisors of the participating
countries) and an EU institution (the ECB), which requires them to cooperate
closely according to a highly centralized, integrated and hierarchical template.
Under this mechanism, national supervisory authorities also enjoy a hybrid
status, not very dissimilar to that of national governors under the ESCB. Follow-
ing a composite format directly inspired from that of the Governing Council
of the ECB, the Supervisory Board, the main organ in charge of financial super-
Rimšēvičs, para. 74.53
D. Sarmiento, ‘Crossing the Baltic Rubicon’ (Verfassungsblog, 4 March 2019) verfassungs-
blog.de/crossing-the-baltic-rubicon/ accessed 11 October 2019.
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J. Bast, ‘Autonomy in Decline? A Comment on Rimsevics and ECB v Latvia’ (Verfassungsblog,
13 May 2019) verfassungsblog.de/autonomy-in-decline-a-commentary-on-rimsevics-and-ecb-v-
latvia/ accessed 11 October 2019.
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According to the Court, Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB establishes a remedy which is
‘very specific, as is apparent from the very small number of persons to whom it is available,
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the unique subject matter of the decisions against which it may be used and the exceptional
circumstances in which it may be exercised’ (Rimšēvičs, para. 71).
For a similar intuition, see R. Smits, ‘ECJ annuls a national measure against an independent
central banker’ (European Law Blog, 5 March 2019) europeanlawblog.eu/2019/03/05/ecj-annuls-
a-national-measure-against-an-independent-central-banker/ accessed 11 October 2019.
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vision within the ECB structure,58 is composed of a Chair and a vice-Chair, four
representatives of the ECB and one representative from each participating na-
tional supervisory authority.59 The independence of Board members is moreover
guaranteed (Article 19). As a consequence, one may argue that the highly inte-
grated nature of the SSM, and the composite nature of the administrative pro-
cedures that constitute it, contributes to blurring the dividing line between the
EU legal order and national legal orders, just like under the ESCB. Berlusconi
can certainly be read along these lines. But would the Court go as far as directly
annulling preparatory acts adopted by national supervisors? This may seem far-
fetched, but Rimšēvičs, as a ruling which dramatically increases the interweaving
of EU law and national law,60 would certainly constitute a useful precedent in
that regard.61 Only time will tell if the Court stands ready to take such a leap.
4.3. What the Berlusconi ruling left open. More preliminary
questions waiting to happen?
However clear and explicit the Court’s pronouncements in
Berlusconi may have been, the decision begs further questions, and raises new
issues that future case law will have to address.
The first set of questions pertains to the concrete implementation of the
extended type of (single) judicial review the Court established in Berlusconi. In
its view, irregularities, either procedural or substantive, affecting the preparatory
acts national supervisory bodies draw up under the SSM do automatically con-
taminate the ECB decisions freely following upon and endorsing these acts, in
such a way that they are for the ECJ and not national courts to investigate, to
establish and to sanction.
The question which arises is however which irregularities could be reviewed
by the ECJ. The field of EU financial and banking law – whereby accordingly
financial supervision is carried out under the SSM – is not fully preempted by
EU law, which is on many counts complemented or further specified by national
law.62 The body of prudential rules that is to be supervised under the SSM
It should however be noted that the Board does not adopt final decisions. Its draft supervisory
decisions are indeed to be endorsed by the Governing Council following a non-objection pro-
cedure.
58
Article 26(1) of the SSM Regulation.59
R. Smits, ‘ECJ annuls a national measure against an independent central banker’ (European
Law Blog, 5 March 2019) europeanlawblog.eu/2019/03/05/ecj-annuls-a-national-measure-
against-an-independent-central-banker/ accessed 11 October 2019.
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The main counter-argument lies in the fact that however ambiguous its formulation may be,
Article 14.2 of the ESCB did provide a textual basis for the Court’s ambitious move in Rimšēvičs.
Such textual basis would however be clearly lacking in the case of the SSM.
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One of the most remarkable features of the SSM is that the ECB itself, when carrying out its
tasks as chief financial supervisor of the EU, is to directly apply all relevant national law provi-
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sions (Article 4(3) of the SSM Regulation). This unprecedented feature raises many issues,
which are progressively being brought to the attention of the Court. In that regard, see L.
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framework is indeed partly contained in directly applicable EU law (regula-
tions),63 but also consists of directives which are to be further transposed in
national legislation.64 Moreover, EU instruments in the field also grants
Member States dozens of options, which they are to exercise through national
instruments.65 Finally, general administrative procedural requirements, such
as the right to be heard, the duty to give reasons, or the principle of legitimate
expectations, continue to apply if and to the extent that these are foreseen by
general domestic administrative law. The ensuing question is therefore
whether only irregularities under EU law or also potentially irregularities under
national law fall within the jurisdiction of the ECJ as a consequence of the Ber-
lusconi ruling. The ruling in the Berlusconi case does not directly answer this
question.
A useful starting point can be found in Advocate General Mischo’s Opinion
in Association Greenpeace France.66 In his view, it was ‘impossible to see how
the Community Court, which has sole jurisdiction to declare a Community act
invalid, could form an opinion as to the existence of an irregularity with respect
to national law’. Indeed, as also argued by Brito Bastos, one of the conditions
for the court to accept the “derivative illegality” of EU decisions based on unlaw-
ful national preparatory decisions is that only illegalities under EU law are to
be reviewed by the Court. As he observes:
‘[T]he purpose of this condition is twofold. First, to ensure that the assess-
ment of the legality of final EU measures is based exclusively on rules of EU
law, as the principle of the autonomy of the EU legal order dictates. Second,
the condition responds to the need to preserve the limits of the jurisdiction of
EU courts, which are only competent to interpret and apply EU law.’67
However, the consequence of this limitation is clearly that irregularities
under national law, which nevertheless remains applicable, will not be subject
to control by any judicial forum. This constitutes a clear vulnus to the rule of
Boucon and D. Jaros (n31) 155-187. See also, for an overview of the relevant case law, M. Prek
and S. Lefèvre (n30) 104-105.
The main instrument in this category is the Capital Requirements Regulation. See Regulation
575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential require-
63
ments for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation 648/2012 [2013]
OJ L176/1.
The most prominent example is the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV). See Directive
2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the
64
activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment
firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC
[2013] OJ L176/338.
In this regard, see European Banking Authority, ‘Overview of options and discretions set out
in Directive 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013’ eba.europa.eu/supervisory-conver-
gence/supervisory-disclosure/options-and-national-discretions accessed 26 June 2019.
65
Case C-6/99 Association Greenpeace France and Others v Ministère de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche
and Others [1999] EU:C:1999:587, Opinion of AG Mischo, para. 98.
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F. Brito Bastos (n1) 126.67
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law. The opposite solution, the ECJ ruling on national supervisors’ abidance
with pure national law elements, also raises many questions. One may doubt
the court’s ability to do so, in view of the insufficient knowledge it may have of
the relevant national legal system, and the applicable regulatory framework.
Moreover, it is unclear how far the Court could go in terms of fact-finding, and
how its concrete assessment of the national phase of the procedure is to be
carried out.68 Even more importantly, law is often to be interpreted, and one
may wonder to what extent the ECJ would be bound by the interpretations
favored by national courts.69 As a matter of principle, the Court tends to follow
the interpretation of national courts, without second-guessing them or question-
ing their legitimacy.70 However, what happens if such interpretation is not
available, or remains unclear? Would the Court be able to freely interpret na-
tional law?
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the structure of the EU legal system,
and the autonomy of both the EU and the national legal orders, would advise
against this kind of initiative, which may harm the uniformity of national law.
Unfortunately, the Treaties do not foresee any mechanism through which the
Court might request the opinion of national courts as to matters of interpretation
of national law (a ‘reverse’ preliminary ruling procedure). The question of
whether the Court of Justice would review national preparatory measures also
against national law remains therefore unanswered.
Moving now to the procedural consequences of the Court’s review of national
preparatory measures, the question arises as to the ‘procedural fate’ of such
measures. Does Berlusconi imply, at least tacitly, that the Court is entitled to
annul erga omnes the preparatory acts irregularly adopted by national supervisors
under the SSM? While the abovementioned Rimšēvičs ruling might – at least
indirectly – indicate that this may be a possible reading, the Court in Berlusconi
seems to be – at least explicitly – excluding that possibility. Its indication that
single judicial review by EU courts can only be envisaged ‘once the decision of
the EU institution bringing the administrative procedure to an end has been
This point is noted specifically by Demkova who argues, in light of established case law, that
the ‘interpretation of facts arising under national law rests solely with the national courts’. She
68
however considers that it ought to be possible for EU courts to undertake a full review of all
relevant facts on the basis of the EU principle of duty of care. S. Demková, ‘The Grand
Chamber’s Take on Composite Procedures under the Single Supervisory Mechanism: Com-
ments on Judgment of 27 June 2018, C-219/17 Silvio Berlusconi v Finanziaria d’investimento
Fininvest SpA (Fininvest) v Banca d’Italia and others, EU:C:2018:502’ (2019) 12 REALaw 209.
This issue, particularly pregnant in the case of the SSM, is not unique to prudential supervision.
On this issue in general, see M. Prek and S. Lefèvre, ‘The EU Courts as “national courts”
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– National law in the EU judicial process’ (2017) 54 CMLR 369.
See K. Lenaerts, I. Maselis and K. Gutman, EU Procedural Law (OUP 2015) 233-234 and case
law herein cited.
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adopted’71 suggests that the actual ‘object’ of judicial review is only this final
EU act, which will be the only measure subject to annulment. What concretely
is the ‘destiny’ of the contaminating national preparatory measure (annulment
erga omnes, disapplication inter partes, or something else) remains unclear.
However, it could be argued that in any case, on the basis of the principle of
loyal cooperation, national authorities would have the duty to ensure that an
invalid national preparatory measure is no longer applied and – if needed – to
adopt a new, valid, measure.
Finally, one may wonder to what extent the Court’s findings in Berlusconi,
and the centralized model of judicial review it consecrates, could be replicated
in other settings.72 Let us first turn to other procedures carried out under the
SSM framework. It is very clear that Berlusconi, concerning a procedure granting
authorizations for acquisitions of qualifying holdings in credit institutions
(Article 4(1)(c) of the SSM Regulation), could be applied in the context of the
other two so-called ‘common procedures’, namely the granting and the with-
drawal of authorizations to operate as a credit institution (Article 4(1)(a) of the
SSM Regulation). By extension, Berlusconi’s ratio decidendi could also be applied
to all other SSM procedures meeting the criteria identified in Berlusconi, i.e.
procedures involving NCAs at a preparatory stage (and responsible for a first
assessment and the preparation of draft decisions) and culminating with a final,
discretionary decision of the ECB.73 One may also ask about the relevance of
Berlusconi for other policy fields, and other complex administrative settings. It
is foreseeable that the Berlusconi ruling might also find application with respect
to other composite procedures, where the decision-making process culminates
at the EU level and is based on a series of non-binding national preparatory
steps, such as customs74 or funds.75
What however remains still unclear is the applicability of either the Borelli
or the Berlusconi rulings, first of all, to composite procedures having more than
one step, such as the marketing authorization of GMOs and, second of all,
Berlusconi, para. 49. See also Case 60/81 IBM Corporation v Commission [1981] EU:C:1981:264,
paras 10-11.
71
It should be noted that in the recent Iccrea ruling, the Court has confirmed the applicability
of its finding in Berlusconi in the neighbouring context of the composite procedures of the
Single Resolution Mechanism. See Case C-414/18, Iccrea Banca, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1036
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Think for instance of the situation where the ECB, in the framework of direct prudential super-
vision, relies on the assistance of NCAs (Article 6(3) of the SSM Regulation), for example by
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instructing NCAs to make use of some of their powers (Article 22 of the SSM Framework
Regulation), and subsequently adopts a supervisory decision the content of which is the direct
product of such use.
E.g. in the case of France-aviation, a provision concerning the repayment of import duties was
at stake. Case T-346/94 France-aviation v Commission [1995] EU:T:1995:187.
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[1995] EU:T:1995:4.
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where the national contribution might not entail a formal ‘opinion’ or ‘draft
measure’, but something much more ‘intangible’ and ‘diluted’, such as the
stating of objections or the provision of information.76 Furthermore, what these
cases leave open is the treatment of national preparatory measures taken in the
context of horizontal composite procedures for the implementation of EU law,
where there is no involvement of the EU authorities, but only various forms of
cooperation between national authorities. To what extent can any of the case
law on composite procedure be applied in a situation where two national author-
ities, for example, cooperate for the purposes of deciding on a marketing author-
ization for a pharmaceutical product? As AG Bobek put in a recent opinion,
‘the territorial nature of each of the marketing authorisations and the necessary
correlating territorial nature of judicial review’ will create obstacles to the control
of acts or actions originating in another jurisdiction.77 It is therefore not unlikely
that it will not take long until the topic of composite procedures, in its many
facets, will soon again come to the attention of the Court.
5. Conclusions
The Berlusconi ruling contributes to the growing body of case
law on the legal nature of the SSM and to that concerning the division of juris-
diction between national and European courts in the context of composite pro-
cedures. It clarifies that, whenever a multi-level decision-making process starts
at the national level and culminates with a decision made by the EU authorities,
the determining factor for assigning jurisdiction to the national or the European
level is the question of whether the unlawful national preparatory measure was
binding upon (and is thus de facto not imputable to) the EU authorities. If so,
the jurisdiction to control the national preparatory measure belongs to the na-
tional judiciary. In the opposite case, when the unlawfulness of the national
preparatory measure was endorsed, through the exercise of discretionary powers,
by the EU authorities, jurisdiction for the entirely of the process belongs to the
European courts. This solution seems to be in line with the earlier case law of
the Court of Justice and fully preserves the autonomy of the EU legal order.
However, it also creates the risks of gaps of judicial control if the European
courts’ control is limited to possible illegalities under EU law. This, together
with the questions regarding what division of labour ought to apply in more
‘diluted’ or fully ‘horizontal’ cases of composite procedures, remains un-
answered.
For a discussion on this point, with focus on banking supervision see A. Türk and N. Xanthoulis,
‘Legal accountability of European Central Bank in bank supervision: A case study in conceptu-
alizing the legal effects of Union acts’ (2019) 26 MJECL 151.
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